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Abstract — Access Control is a set of controls to
restrict access to certain resources. If we think about it,
access controls are everywhere around us. A door to
your room, the guards allowing you to enter the office
building on seeing your access card, swiping your card
and scanning your fingers on the biometric system, a
queue for food at the canteen or entering your
credentials to access FB, all are examples of various
types of access control. Here we focus only on the
logical Access Control mechanisms. Access control
mechanisms protect sensitive information from
unauthorized users. However, when sensitive
information is shared and a Privacy Protection
Mechanism (PPM) is not in place, an authorized user
can still compromise the privacy of a person leading to
identity disclosure. A PPM can use suppression and
generalization of relational data to anonymize and
satisfy privacy requirements, e.g., k-anonymity and l-
diversity, against identity and attribute disclosure.
However, privacy is achieved at the cost of precision of
authorized information. In this paper, we propose an
accuracy-constrained privacy-preserving access control
framework. The access control policies define selection
predicates available to roles while the privacy
requirement is to satisfy the k-anonymity or l-diversity.
An additional constraint that needs to be satisfied by
the PPM is the imprecision bound for each selection
predicate. The techniques for workload-aware
anonymization for selection predicates have been
discussed in the literature. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the problem of satisfying the accuracy
constraints for multiple roles has not been studied
before. In our formulation of the aforementioned
problem, we propose heuristics for anonymization
algorithms and show empirically that the proposed
approach satisfies imprecision bounds for more
permissions and has lower total imprecision than the
current state of the art.
Keywords — Access control, privacy, k-anonymity,
query evaluation.
I. Introduction
Access Control Mechanisms: Discretionary Access
Control (DAC) as the name suggests, this access control
model is based on a user’s discretion. i.e, the owner of
the resource can give access rights on that resource to
other users based on his discretion. Access Control Lists
(ACLs)[2] are a typical example of DAC. Specifying the
“rwx” permissions on a unix file owned by you is
another example of DAC Most of the operating systems
including windows, flavors of Unix are based on
DAC[3] Model Mandatory Access Control (MAC): In
this Model, users/owners do not enjoy the privilege of
deciding who can access their files. Here the operating
system is the decision maker overriding the user’s
wishes. In this model every Subject (users) and Object
(resources) are classified and assigned with a security
label. The security labels of the subject and the object
along with the security policy determine if the subject
can access the object. The rules for how subjects access
objects are made by the security officer, configured by
the administrator, enforced by the operating system, and
supported by security technologies.
This is a stricter and rather static Access Control model
as compared to DAC and is mostly suited for military
organizations where data classification and
confidentiality is of prime importance. Special types of
the UNIX operating systems are based on MAC model.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC): RBAC is the
buzzword across enterprises today. In this model the
access to a resource is governed based on the role that
the subject holds within an organization. RBAC [15] is
also known as non-discretionary Access Control because
the user inherits privileges that are tied to his role. The
user does not have a control over the role that he will be
assigned. Each of the above Access Models has its own
advantages and disadvantages. The selection of the
appropriate Access Model by an organization should be
done by considering various factors such as type of
business, no of users, organization’s security policy etc.
For implementing any access control, the two driving
factors are 1. Least privilege principle i.e, the user
should only have the minimum privileges to perform the
tasks that he is supposed to do.
2. Segregation of duties i.e, having more than one user to
perform a critical task so as to reduce the risk of internal
frauds. As the no of users and the resources grow in an
organization, it becomes extremely difficult to manage
user’s access rights through ACLs. It not only increases
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the cost of administration but also results in granting of
excess privileges to users thus violating the least
privilege principle and hence exposing the organization
to risks. Moreover, the complexity involved with this
approach makes it too hard for any organization to
comply with the regulatory compliances.
So in organizations where the no of users and the
employee turnover is large, RBAC [15] is the optimum
solution for Access Control. By having privileges tied to
roles, and users being assigned to these roles, makes it
much simpler for an organization to manage the access
to its resources. RBAC also fastens the employee on-
boarding & de-boarding process by tying the
provisioning/de-provisioning to the roles.
Moreover, RBAC also makes the implementation of
least privilege principle and SOD easier, hence helping
the organizations in complying to the strict regulatory
standards.
RBAC but the roles itself are vaguely defined? Or if
proper consideration is not given to the privileges being
assigned to Roles. The whole purpose of adopting
RBAC stands defeated in this case. This is where Role
Engineering comes into play. I thought before heading to
role engineering it’s important that the reader is aware of
a few basic concepts related to access
control. Organization collects and analyzes consumer
data to improve their services. Access Control
Mechanisms (ACM) are used to ensure that only
authorized information is available to users. However,
sensitive information can still be misused by authorized
users to compromise the privacy of consumers. The
concept of privacy-preservation for sensitive data can
require the enforcement of privacy policies or the
protection against identity disclosure by satisfying some
privacy requirements [1]. In this paper, we investigate
privacy-preservation from the anonymity aspect. The
sensitive information, even after the removal of
identifying attributes, is still susceptible to linking
attacks by the authorized users [2]. This problem has
been studied extensively in the area of micro data
publishing [3] and privacy definitions, e.g., k-anonymity
[2], l-diversity [4], and variance diversity [5].
Anonymization algorithms use suppress on and
generalization of rec rds to satisfy privacy requirements
with minimal distortion of micro data. The anonymity
techniques can be used with an access control
mechanism to ensure both security and privacy of the
sensitive information. The privacy is achieved at the cost
of accuracy and imprecision is introduced in the
authorized information under an access control policy.
We use the concept of imprecision bound for each
permission to define a threshold on the amount of
imprecision that can be tolerated. Existing
workloadaware anonymization techniques [5], [6]
minimize the imprecision aggregate for all queries and
the imprecision added to each permission/query in the
anonymized micro data is not known. Making the
privacy requirement more stringent (e.g., increasing the
value of k or l) results in additional imprecision for
queries. However, the problem of satisfying accuracy
constraints for individual permissions in a
policy/workload has not been studied before. The
heuristics proposed in this paper for accuracy-
constrained privacy-preserving access control are also
relevant in the context of workload-aware
anonymization. In this paper the focus is on a static
relational table that is anonymized only once. To
exemplify our approach, role-based access control is
assumed. However, the concept of accuracy constraints
for permissions can be applied to any privacy-preserving
security policy, e.g., discretionary access control.
Example1 (Motivating Scenario). Syndromic
surveillance systems are used at the state and federal
levels to detect and monitor threats to public health [7].
The department of health in a state collects the
emergency department data
Figure 1 Access Control Policy
(age, gender, location, time of arrival, symptoms, etc.)
from county hospitals daily. Generally, each daily update
consists of a static instance that is classified into
syndrome categories by the department of health. Then,
the surveillance data is anonymized and shared with
departments of health at each county. An access control
policy is given in Fig. 1 that allows the roles to access
the tuples under the authorized predicate, e.g., Role CE1
can access tuples under Permission P1. The
epidemiologists at the state and county level suggest
community containment measures, e.g., isolation or
quarantine according to the number of persons infected
in case of a flu outbreak. According to the population
density in a county, an epidemiologist can advise
isolation if the number of persons reported with
influenza are greater than 1,000 and quarantine if that
number is greater than 3,000 in a single day. The
anonymization adds imprecision to the query results and
the imprecision bound for each query ensures that the
results are within the tolerance required. If the
imprecision bounds are not satisfied then unnecessary
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false alarms are generated due to the high rate of false
positives.
First, we formulate the accuracy and privacy constraints
as the problem of k-anonymous Partitioning with
Imprecision Bounds (k-PIB) and give hardness results.
Second, we introduce the concept of accuracy-
constrained privacy-preserving access control for
relational data. Third, we propose heuristics to
approximate the solution of the k-PIB problem and
conduct empirical evaluation.
Given a relation T= {A1,A2, . . .,An}, where Ai is an
attribute, T* is the anonymized version of the relation T.
We assume that T is a static relational table. The
attributes can be of the following types: Identifier.
Attributes, e.g., name and social security that can
uniquely identify an individual. These attributes are
completely removed from the anonymized relation.
Quasi-identifier(QI). Attributes, e.g., gender, zip code,
birth date that can potentially identify an individual
based on other information available to an adversary. QI
attributes are generalized to satisfy the anonymity
requirements. Sensitive attribute. Attributes, e.g., disease
or salary, that if associated to a unique individual will
cause a privacy breach.
II .PROBLEM STATEMENT
However, when sensitive information is shared and a
Privacy Protection Mechanism (PPM) is not in place, an
authorized user can still compromise the privacy of a
person leading to identity disclosure. A PPM can use
suppression and generalization of relational data to
anonymize and satisfy privacy requirements, e.g., k-
anonymity and l-diversity, against identity and attribute
disclosure. However, privacy is achieved at the cost of
precision of authorized information.
III .RELATED WORK
Access control mechanisms for databases allow queries
only on the authorized part of the database [8], [10].
Predicate based fine-grained access control has further
been proposed, where user authorization is limited to
pre-defined predicates [11]. Enforcement of access
control and privacy policies has been studied in [2].
However, studying the interaction between the access
control mechanisms and the privacy protection
mechanisms has been missing. Recently, Chaudhuri et
al. have studied access control with privacy mechanisms
[14]. They use the definition of differential privacy [15]
whereby random noise is added to original query results
to satisfy privacy constraints. However, they have not
considered the accuracy constraints for permissions. We
define the privacy requirement in terms of k-anonymity.
It has been shown by Li et al. [16] that after sampling, k-
anonymity offers similar privacy guarantees as those of
differential privacy. The proposed accuracy-constrained
privacy preserving access control framework allows the
access control administrator to specify imprecision
constraints that the
Figure 3 Improvements after repartitioning for k-
anonymity for the Census data set.
Privacy protection mechanism is required to meet along
with the privacy requirements. The challenges of
privacy-aware access control are similar to the problem
of workload-aware anonymization. In our analysis of the
related work, we focus on query-aware anonymization.
For the state of the art in k-anonymity techniques and
algorithms, we refer the reader to a recent survey paper
[3]. Workload-aware anonymization is first studied by
LeFevre et al. [14]. They have proposed the Selection
Mondrian algorithm, which is a modification to the
greedy multidimensional partitioning algorithm
Mondrian [13]. In their algorithm, based on the given
query-workload, the greedy splitting heuristic minimizes
the sum of imprecision for all queries. Iwuchukwu and
Naughton have proposed an Rþ-tree based
anonymization algorithm [6]. The authors illustrate by
experiments that anonymized data using biased Rþ-tree
based on the given query workload is more accurate for
those queries than for an unbiased algorithm. Ghinita et
al. have proposed algorithms based on space filling
curves for k-anonymity and l-diversity [7]. They also
introduce the problem of accuracy-constrained
anonymization for a given bound of acceptable
information loss for each equivalence class [8].
Similarly, Xiao et al. [1] propose to add noise to queries
according to the size of the queries in a given workload
to satisfy differential privacy. However, bounds for
query imprecision have not been considered.
The existing literature on workload-aware
anonymization has a focus to minimize the overall
imprecision for a given set of queries. However,
anonymization with imprecision constraints for
individual queries has not been studied before. We
follow the imprecision definition of LeFevre et al. [5]
and introduce the constraint of imprecision bound for
each query in a given query workload.
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Access Control for Relational Data
Fine-grained access control for relational data allows to
define tuple-level permissions, e.g., Oracle VPD [8] and
SQL [9]. For evaluating user queries, most approaches
assume a Truman model [10]. In this model, a user query
is modified by the access control mechanism and only
the authorized tuples are returned. Column level access
control allows queries to execute on the authorized
column of the relational data only [8], [11]. Cell level
access control for relational data is implemented by
replacing the unauthorized cell values by NULL values
[12]. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) allows
defining permissions on objects based on roles in an
organization. An RBAC policy configuration is
composed of a set of Users (U), a set of Roles (R), and a
set of Permissions (P). For the relational RBAC model,
we assume that the selection predicates on the QI
attributes define permission [11]. UA is a user-to-role (U
R) assignment relation and PA is a roleto-permission (R
P) assignment relation. A role hierarchy (RH) defines an
inheritance relationship among roles and is a partial
order on roles (R R) [13].Each permission defines a
hyper-rectangle in the tuple space and all the tuples
enclosed by this hyper-rectangle are authorized to the
role assigned to the permission. In practice, when a user
assigned to a role executes a query, the tuples satisfying
the conjunction of the query predicate and the
permission are returned [1], [10].
Definition 1 (Equivalence Class (EC)). An equivalence
class is a set of tuples having the same QI attribute
values.
Definition 2 (k-anonymity Property). A table T* satisfies
the
k-anonymity property if each equivalence class has k or
more
tuples [2].
k-anonymity is prone to homogeneity attacks when the
sensitive value for all the tuples in an equivalence class
is the same. To counter this shortcoming, l-diversity has
been proposed [4] and requires that each equivalence
class of
Figure 2 Generalization for K-anonymity and l-diversity
T* contain at least l distinct values of the sensitive
attribute. For sensitive numeric attributes, an l-diverse
equivalence class can still leak information if the
numeric values are close to each other. For such cases,
variance diversity [5] has been proposed that requires the
variance of each equivalence class to be greater than a
given variance diversity parameter. The table in Fig. 2a
does not satisfy k-anonymity because knowing the age
and zip code of a person allows associating a disease to
that person. The table in Fig. 2b is a 2-anonymous and 2-
diverse version of table in Fig. 2a. The ID attribute is
removed in the anonymized table and is shown only for
identification of tuples. Here, for any combination of
selection predicates on the zip code and age attributes,
there are at least two tuples in each equivalence class. In
Section 4, algorithms are presented for kanonymity only.
However, the experiments are performed for both l-
diversity and variance diversity using the proposed
heuristics for partitioning.
IV. Conclusion
The access control mechanism allows only authorized
query predicates on sensitive data. The
privacypreserving module anonymizes the data to meet
privacy requirements and imprecision constraints on
predicates set by the access control mechanism. We
formulate this interaction as the problemof k-anonymous
Partitioning with Imprecision Bounds (k-PIB).An
accuracy-constrained privacy-preserving access control
framework for relational data has been proposed. The
framework is a combination of access control and
privacy protection mechanisms.. We give hardness
results for the k-PIB problem and present heuristics for
partitioning the data to the satisfy the privacy constraints
and the imprecision bounds. In the current work, static
access control and relational data model has been
assumed. For future work, we plan to extend the
proposed privacy-preserving access control to
incremental data and cell level access control.
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